View source for Stills: Battle of the Little Big Horn

'''Battle of the Little Big Horn'''
''by Joe Sills, Jr.''

On May 17, 1876, the 7th United States Cavalry Regiment under Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer left Fort Abraham Lincoln, Dakota Territory, as part of a column commanded by Brigadier General Alfred H. Terry. This column, with two others already in the field led by Brigadier General George Crook and Colonel John Gibbon, was to participate in the effort to force all Sioux and Northern Cheyenne in the unceded territory back to their reservations. When the 7th Cavalry left on the expedition, it didso divided into twowings, the right under Major Marcus A. Reno and theleft under CaptainFrederick W. Benteen. Within the right wing were the battalions of CaptainMyles W. Keogh (Companies B, C and I) and Captain George W. Yates(Companies E, F and L). The left wing was comprisedof battalions underCaptain Thomas B. Weir (Companies A, D and H) and Captain Thomas H.French (Companies G, K and M). The regiment consisted of approximately 750officers and enlisted men, although the exact number is open to question, andwas accompanied by a contingent of about forty Arikara Indian scouts. Also inthe column were three companies of infantry and a Gatling gun platoon, allsupported by wagons carrying supplies.On June 7, Terry’s column reached the confluence ofthe Powder andYellowstone Rivers from which point he left to confer with Gibbon on June 9,and then returned. The right wing of the 7th Cavalry, along with one Gatlinggun, was then ordered on a scout intended to take the unit up the Powder River,then over to the Tongue River, and back to the Yellowstone. Reno exceeded, ordisobeyed, those orders by proceeding further westto Rosebud Creek where hefound an Indian trail. He followed the trail upstream for perhaps 45 miles beforereturning to the Yellowstone.On June 21, the remainder of the 7th Cavalry joinedReno below the mouthof the Rosebud and the whole regiment moved to thejunction of that stream andthe Yellowstone. On the same day, Terry, Gibbon, Custer and Major JamesBrisbin held a conference on board the steamerFar West. The decision reachedwas that Gibbon’s infantry and Brisbin’s 2nd Cavalry would proceed up theYellowstone, cross and go south up the Big Horn. Custer and the 7th Cavalrywere to move south along the Rosebud, then cross tothe Little Big Horn, andreturn along that stream. The obvious hope was thatthe Indians would be foundin the area of the Little Big Horn and be trapped between the two columns.During the course of the meeting, Custer declined the offer of the Gatling gunbattery on the grounds that it could hinder his progress. He also refused the fourcompanies of the 2nd Cavalry under Brisbin, sayingthat the 7th Cavalry couldhandle anything it met. To assist Custer, six Crowscouts from Gibbon’scommand were assigned along with the famous civilian guide and scout MitchBouyer. George Herendeen was attached to Custer forthe purpose of scoutingthe upper reaches of Tulloch’s Fork and carrying the results of that scout toTerry. The conference resulted in the now famous “Orders” dated June 22, toCuster from Terry. The verbal and written battles waged over the meaning, forceand effect of these orders began soon after the actual battle ended, and persisteven today. That debate is too extensive to be included here but is somethingwhich the serious student must deal with and resolve apart from this work.At noon on June 22, the 7th Cavalry proceeded up the Rosebud about 12miles. While at the Yellowstone, Custer had abolished the wing/battalionassignments for reasons unknown, informing Reno that command assignmentswould be made on the march. That evening, Custer told his assembled officersthat he expected they might face a warrior force ofup to 1500, and if he got ontheir trail he would pursue, even if beyond the fifteen days for which they wererationed. The regimental supplies were carried by amake-shift mule train oftwelve mules per company with some additional animals to transportheadquarters and miscellaneous equipment. Twelve mules each carried two1000-round ammunition boxes, or 2000 rounds per company. Each soldier wasarmed with the single-shot, .45 caliber, Model 1873Springfield carbine, andwas ordered to carry 100 rounds of 45-55 carbine ammunition of which fiftyrounds was to be on his person. The troopers also carried the Model 1873 Colt.45 caliber, single-action revolver with twenty-four rounds of ammunition.Despite artwork to the contrary, no sabres were carried after the expedition leftthe Powder River camp. It further appears from recent archeological surveys thatsome of the soldiers may have carried weapons otherthan those mentioned, andthat some men and officers had “personal” weapons with them.On June 23, the regiment marched about thirty-threemiles and campedabout 5 p.m.Saturday, June 24, found the regiment on the marchby 5 a.m. Indiancampsites were passed and examined and, after a march of some 28 miles, thecommand went into camp. That evening Custer calledFirst Lieutenant CharlesA. Varnum to him and stated that the Crow scouts believed the Sioux were inthe Little Big Horn valley. Custer wanted someone to accompany the Crowsscouts to a spot, later to become famous as the “Crow’s Nest,” from which thescouts said they could see the Sioux and Northern Cheyenne camp fires whenstarted in the early morning. Custer wanted a messenger to be sent back withinformation as soon as possible. Varnum was to leave about 9 p.m. and Custerwould follow with the regiment at 11 p.m. and thought he could be at the base ofthe divide between the Rosebud and Little Big Hornbefore morning. Varnumalong with Charlie Reynolds, a white scout, some Crow and Arikara scouts leftas ordered.Custer turned the regiment westward toward the divide and marched aboutfour hours until the weary unit halted. At this point, a message was receivedfrom Varnum stating that the scouts had seen camp fire smoke and a pony herdin the valley, and the regiment again moved out about 8 a.m. Later that morningCuster arrived at the Crow’s Nest, looked through field glasses at the indicatedsite but, like Varnum earlier, was unable to see what the Crow scouts had seen.Although Benteen later claimed Custer did not believe the scouts’ report,Custer’s subsequent actions were those of a commander taking his commandtoward a scene of action.Upon his return to the regiment, Custer was told that a detail of troopers, ledby Sergeant William A. Curtis of F Company, had come upon an Indian tryingto open a lost box or bundle of clothing. There were other reports fromHerendeen and Bouyer of sightings of Indians who, it was assumed, had alsodiscovered the regiment. Since it was the Indians’custom to scatter in thepresence of troops, Custer decided to strike immediately, rather than layconcealed during June 25 and attack on the morningof the 26th.At about noon on June 25, at the Rosebud-Little BigHorn divide, Custerhalted the regiment and proceeded to assign commands. Reno receivedCompanies A, G and M, and Benteen, Companies D, H and K. It is probable thatCaptain Keogh was given Companies I, L and C, and Captain Yates, CompaniesE and F. Captain Thomas McDougall’s Company B was assigned as packtrainguard. Furthermore, a noncommissioned officer and six privates were detailedfrom each company to help with company pack mules.Benteen was ordered to scout toward a line of hillsto the left front. Afterhis departure, two messengers were sent directing him to go beyond the line ofhills in view. This scout is sometimes characterized as Custer’s way ofappearing to comply with Terry’s directive that hefeel “... constantly to your left..,” but more likely represents Custer’s reaction to his experience at the Washita,when he found that Indian villages camped separately along the same stream.The balance of the regiment proceeded down Reno (orSundance, or Ash)Creek toward the Little Big Horn, Reno’s command onthe left bank andCuster’s two battalions on the right, with the packtrain bringing up the rear.Around 2 p.m. Reno’s battalion crossed over the creek to join Custer’scommand on the right bank. Shortly after, the combined columns arrived in thevicinity of the Lone Tepee, the location of which is still a matter of dispute.Near this point, Fred Girard, civilian interpreterfor the Arikara scouts,spotted a group of Indians fleeing toward the river, and heavy dust clouds wereseen in the valley. Riding to the top of a small knoll, Girard called out to Custer,“Here are your Indians, running like devils.”Custer sent his adjutant, First Lieutenant WilliamW. Cooke, to Reno withthe order, “Custer says to move at as rapid a gaitas you think prudent and tocharge afterwards, and you will be supported by thewhole outfit.” This was thelast and only order Reno ever received and, in fact, was the last communicationfrom Custer’s command.In obedience to the order, Reno proceeded to the Little Big Horn River at afast trot, crossed and halted on the far side of some timber to gather thecompanies which had lost formation in the crossing.Meanwhile, Girard still onthe right bank had heard the Crow and Arikara callout that the Sioux, in largenumbers, were coming up to meet Reno, an observation also made by the scoutHerendeen. Thinking that Custer should know of thisdevelopment, he turnedback and quickly came upon Cooke who was riding toward the river. AfterGirard relayed his information, Cooke stated he would report to Custer andturned back immediately.Reno advanced down the valley toward the Indian village which was abouttwo miles from the river crossing. During this movement Reno sent two separatemessages, carried by Privates Archibald McIlhargeyand John Mitchell, toCuster, each with the same information that the Indians were in force in front ofhim.Indians poured across Reno’s front, many moving tothe bluffs on his left.Reno halted and dismounted his command of 124 soldiers to fight in a skirmishline formation, with his right resting on the timber near the river, and extendingto his left toward the bluffs. The line advanced about 100 yards toward thevillage, but no further. Reno sent the horses and GCompany into the timber.Out on the valley floor the battle continued, and as the Indians moved to Reno’sleft, he withdrew the skirmish line to the edge ofthe timber. The length of thefight until the line withdrew is a matter of argument with opinions ranging fromfive minutes to a half-hour.Once in the timber, the fight continued until Reno,not receiving thepromised support of “the whole outfit,” and concerned about the expenditure ofnon-replaceable ammunition, decided to withdraw tothe bluffs on the east sideof the river. Varnum, Lieutenant Charles C. DeRudio, and the scout Girard, allsaw Custer and/or his command moving north along the bluffs to the east of theLittle Big Horn, but no one informed Reno of Custer’s movements. Reno wasable to mount most, but clearly not all, of his command in a clearing in thetimber. A volley of shots rang out and the Arikarascout, Bloody Knife, atReno’s side, died from a bullet in the head, spattering blood and brains overReno. Orders to dismount, then mount were given, and the command left thetimber for the eastern heights. No organized resistance to the onslaught of thewarriors took place either during the retreat or atthe river crossing. This retreat,called a charge by Reno, resulted in the reported loss of three officers, 30enlisted men, three civilians and two Arikara scouts. It terminated on the bluffsnear the current Reno-Benteen battle site, and theresult at the time must haveappeared even worse, for in addition to those ultimately found dead, there werean officer, three civilians and fifteen soldiers missing, all but four of whomrejoined later that afternoon.Shortly after reaching the bluffs, Reno was joinedby Benteen’s battalionwhich had returned to the trail some distance abovethe Lone Tepee. On his wayto the river, Benteen was passed by Sergeant DanielKanipe of Company C whocarried a message to the pack train. The message was for the train to come onacross country and, in essence, not to worry aboutthe loss of packs unless theycontained ammunition. Benteen was next met by Trumpeter John Martin ofBenteen’s own Company H with the now famous, and disputed, message,“Benteen, Come on. Big village, Be quick. Bring packs. W.W. Cooke. P.S.Bring Packs.” The dispute over this latter messageis whether or not its intentwas to have Benteen bring forward only the twelve mules with all the reserveammunition. Proponents of the “ammunition packs” theory assert that Custerintended to make a stand and would need the reserveammunition. Opponentspoint out that the word “ammunition” is not used, that Custer had not yet evenbecome engaged, and that to sequester all the ammunition implies anindifference to the fate of Reno and the pack train.In any event, Benteen reached the river in time tosee the last of Reno’s“charge” to the bluffs. He joined the shattered unit and Lieutenant Luther Harewas swiftly dispatched to the pack train to bring up several mules withammunition. At about the same time, firing down river was heard indicating thatCuster was engaged. In response to this, Weir, on his own, started down riverperhaps thirty-five minutes after arrival at Reno’sposition. Lieutenant WinfieldS. Edgerly, believing Weir had permission to advance, ordered Company D tomount and follow. This precipitated the disjointedmovement by Reno’scommand. Upon arrival of McDougall and the pack train, Companies H, K andM followed D to a prominent point along the bluffs(today known as Weir Point)and the remainder of the command started in that direction but made littleprogress. The units on Weir Point abandoned that position and, again in a ratheruncontrolled manner, moved back to the area occupied during the siege. Themovement was prevented from becoming a disaster byLieutenant Edward S.Godfrey, who on his own authority, dismounted K Company and covered theretreat. Reno’s command was quickly surrounded andcame under heavy fire.Earlier that afternoon, when Custer gave his last order to Reno, he probablyhad no plan for an enveloping maneuver. However, ashe approached the riverhe was met by Adjutant Cooke bringing Girard’s information that the Indianswere coming up to meet Reno. This was almost immediately reinforced by thearrival of the first of the soldiers sent by Reno with a message to the same effect.The arrival of the second soldier added emphasis tothe fact that a large numberof Indians were in the valley. The dust in the valley probably indicated to Custerthat the noncombatants were fleeing north. A flanking maneuver to get to thewomen and children and, at the same time, placing the warriors between himand Reno must have seemed appropriate. In any event, Custer turned north.From this point on, there are few absolutes about Custer’s action except itsoutcome. Theories abound. The last soldiers to seehim were Kanipe, sent backwhen Custer first reached a bluff overlooking the river, and Trumpeter Martin,whose point of departure is disputed. Some writersplace it in Cedar Coulee andothers at the junction of Custer’s northward approach and Medicine Tail Coulee,for Martin himself said they had reached a ravine which ran toward the river.There is controversy whether Custer moved along thebluffs next to the river orbehind Sharpshooter’s Ridge, a prominence north ofthe Reno-Benteen defensesite. Likewise, there are differences of opinion about whether or not Custerpersonally went to Weir Point, the highest point nearest the river. This wouldhave afforded Custer an unlimited view of the village had he gone there. Inopposition, there is the unquestioned fact that atleast four Crow scouts weredefinitely on Weir Point and not one of them placesCuster, or any other soldier,there at any time. Additionally, Martin testified that only the Crow scouts wentto Weir Point and that Custer was never there.No matter the route, from there we know, with reasonable certainty, thelocation of the dead, though the theories of Custer’s final actions are numerous.Passing Sharpshooter’s Ridge and proceeding down Cedar Coulee, Custerand his men arrived and halted at the junction of Cedar and South Medicine TailCoulees. One part of Custer’s command, probably Keogh’s battalion, with threecompanies, moved north and occupied areas on what is known as Nye-Cartwright Ridge. This ridge divides South MedicineTail Coulee and NorthMedicine Tail Coulee, sometimes called Deep Coulee.The latter is the deepravine at the base of the ridge which runs from Calhoun Hill toward the LittleBig Horn where it joins the mouth of South MedicineTail. Cartridge casingfinds clearly indicate troops firing from that point, and any concept of Custer’sfinal battle must include that action if it is to have any validity.One theory has the second part of Custer’s command,probably Yates’battalion with two companies, advanced down Medicine Tail Coulee, and waseither met by overwhelming force and driven to Battle Ridge, or was recalled bythe firing from Keogh’s battalion on Nye-CartwrightRidge. The two battalionsrejoined near Battle Ridge, continued north into the present area of the nationalcemetery, and were finally driven back to Battle Ridge. On the ridge, LieutenantJames Calhoun with Company L, was positioned in anarea on the south end ofthe ridge (now called Calhoun Hill) where that company died, according tocontemporary evidence, in skirmish line formation.Keogh and Company I werefound on the eastern slope of the Ridge somewhat “in a bunch” which is inaccord with some Indian accounts. This theory further places Companies E andC in skirmish line below the Last Stand area and Company F generallysurrounding Custer and the headquarters unit on Last Stand Hill. The markersbelow the Calhoun position allegedly represent troopers shot down, or cut off, asthe battalion made its way to its final destruction.Another theory has Yates’ battalion reconnoiteringthe ford at the mouth ofMedicine Tail while Keogh’s battalion positioned themselves on Nye-Cartwright Ridge, presumptively waiting for Benteenand the packs. Bothcommands then rejoined on Calhoun Hill. From thereYates’ battalion movednorthward as far as the flat land north and west ofthe Battle Ridge whileKeogh’s battalion remained on Calhoun Hill to awaitthe arrival of Benteen andto cover the Medicine Tail approaches. These two battalions were thenseparately engaged by large numbers of Sioux and Cheyenne. Keogh’s battaliondied first: Company C on the lower slopes of the ridge in the Greasy GrassRidge area; Company L on Calhoun Hill; and CompanyI on the eastern slope.The battalion with Custer attained the final standposition where it succumbed tothe fire power of the Indian force. Modifications and combinations of bothapproaches exists, and the scholar will have to arrive at an independentconclusion about any of them.The recent archaeological studies have made clear that although the Siouxand Cheyenne were not uniformly armed with rifles and pistols, there were farmore firearms present than previously believed. Thecartridge casings providedthe evidence of a far larger number of repeating rifles among the Indianweaponry. These casings also indicate that the flowof battle moved from theCalhoun position to the Last Stand area. Furthermore, the Indian armamentwould have steadily improved as carbines, pistols and ammunition were takenfrom the dead.A caveat to the serious student: Although the geographical references havebeen the traditional ones, north (Last Stand), south (Calhoun Hill), east (Keogh’sslope) and west (riverside), the Indian geography is different and Indianaccounts must be perused carefully to determine which is being used. To theIndian, north is Keogh’s slope; south (riverside),east (Calhoun Hill) and west(Last Stand).Once the Custer fight was finished, the Indians surrounded Reno on theevening of June 25. Reno’s companies were formed ina rough horseshoeposition with the open end upriver. The fire from around 7 p.m. until darknesswas heavy and some eleven soldiers were killed on the bluff. A hospital wasestablished in a swale, and the horses and mules positioned at the open side ofthe swale to protect the wounded.During the night some entrenchments were dug. Packs, boxes and deadanimals were dragged into position to protect the troops, particularly inCompany A’s area at the end of the horseshoe on theeastern side of the siegearea.On June 26, the battle commenced around 2:30 in themorning. The troopswere under constant long range fire, particularly Benteen’s Co. H in which therewere a large number of wounded. The warriors approached Benteen closelyfrom the river side, but a charge drove them from the surrounding knolls andravines. This opened the way for water carrier parties to obtain some water fromthe Little Big Horn which then was distributed to the wounded. Late thatafternoon, the troops saw a welcome sight as the entire village withdrew in anupstream direction.It was not until the morning of June 27 that the reason for the withdrawalwas clear. The Montana column led by Terry and Gibbon had camped about twomiles downstream of the Indian camp the night before, and reached the valleysite the next day. On June 26, on their way to thejuncture with the 7th Cavalry,three of Custer’s Crow scouts had met Lieutenant James Bradley’s detachmentof Crow scouts and mounted infantry. The fleeing Crows told a story of disasterto Custer which was met with skepticism by the white officers but which led allof Bradley’s Crows to leave immediately.On the morning of June 27, Bradley reported to Terry and Gibbon whowere then on the site of the Indian camp. He statedthat he had found 197 bodieson the hills to the east. What the Gibbon men thought were dead buffalo, werethe mingled bodies of dead horses and soldiers stripped of their clothing .The two commands then moved into the river bottom,and the soldiers spentmost of the day bringing the wounded down from thebluffs. Some investigationof the field was made that day, principally by Benteen, and the next day the 7thCavalry turned to the gruesome task of burying itsdead. The burials wereanything but complete, consisting for the most part, of a little dirt and sagebrushthrown over the corpse.Although the figures vary somewhat, 208 bodies werefound and buried,with identification difficult, if not impossible inmany cases. Many bodies hadbeen subjected to extensive mutilation immediatelyafter death, and all had beenexposed to the hot Montana sun for three days.On June 28, an effort was made to move the woundedto the steamerFarWest, primarily using hand carried litters. The task proved impossible. The nextday was given over to creating mule-borne litters with which all of the woundedwere successfully carried to the waiting steamer inan all night march. There thewounded were placed on the boat for transport to Fort Abraham Lincoln. Therest of the expedition awaited reinforcements before continuing the campaign.The Little Big Horn battle was easily the worst defeat ever sustained by theU.S. Army in Plains Indian warfare with the 7th Cavalry suffering 268 killed ordying of wounds, and 62 wounded.The news shocked the nation and gave rise to an endless debate about thefacts, strategy and tactics of the battle which continues to the present day.Joe Sills, Jr.Baltimore, MarylandNote: This version of the Little Big Horn battle was written by Joe in 1995and is presented here virtually unchanged from thattime. Joe was probably oneof the most knowledgeable people on this battle. Hepresented a number ofpapers at the CBHMA annual symposium and there is little doubt in my mindthat he possessed the capability to accurately assess the events that occurred onthose two fateful days in 1876. Joe passed away in2003 and he has been sorelymissed. Ron Nichols